



crico

Shifting Patient Safety into High Gear

Boston, MA, November 16, 2012



Shifting
Patient
Safety into
High Gear

crico

PSO: Theory to Practice

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Agenda

- Goals and Objectives
- Current Activities
 - Pilot to Present
- Future Vision

AMC|PSO Objectives:

- Create a bridge between malpractice and real-time data
- Create a secure, protected space to convene member organizations in response to real-time events


*Bridging Malpractice Data
with “Real-time” Data*

New Data Sources

- Adverse Event Data
- Root Cause Analysis Data
- Patient Complaint Data

9-month pilot

Linking the Data Sets (aka “Mapping”)



Note: The same event can be mapped to several categories or to multiple values of the same category

Data Limitations


- Different Data Structure
- Different Definitions
- Different Interpretation of the Event

Examples of Event Severity


AHRQ	A	B	D	E
Severity Desc	Severity_desc	Severity_desc	Severity Desc	Severity Desc
A: Unsafe Condition: (Non Event)	1: No Injury	1. No Injury	0. Near Miss	0-Near Miss / Potential Harm / Damage
B1: Near Miss: No harm; didn't reach patient/caught by chance	2: Minor Injury	2: Minor Injury	1. No injury / monitoring only	1- No Harm / Damage
B2: Near Miss: No harm, didn't reach patient b/c active recovery by caregiver	3: Moderate Injury	3: Moderate Injury	2. Minor	2- Temporary or Minor Harm / Damage
C: No harm: Reached patient; no monitoring required	4: Major injury	4: Major Injury	3. Moderate	4- Death
D: No harm, Reached patient; monitoring required	5: Death	5: Catastrophic	4. Majority	
E: Harm, Temporary, Intervention needed			5. Death	
F: Harm, Temporary, hospitalization needed				
G: Harm, Permanent				
H: Permanent, Intervention required to sustain life				
I: Death				

Issues Identified in Existing Reporting Systems


MALPRACTICE CLAIMS



PATIENT COMPLAINTS



INCIDENT REPORTING



Source: Levtzion-Korach, O, et al. Joint Commission Article on Quality & Patient Safety, September 2010

Lessons learned

- Multiple data resides in multiple areas
 - Overlapping, complementary information
 - Difficult to merge
- Data sources vary by:
 - Timing
 - Severity
 - Reporter
 - Taken individually, highlight specific areas in need of attention
- Lack of common definitions and data structure creates disparate analytic results

The Journey to
Root Cause Analysis:
A Roadmap to Action

Challenges with current RCA process

- Lack of standardized definitions
- Lack of uniformity in how data is captured
- Thus...in existing state, unable to compare across different organizations

RCA Workgroup

Mapping to MedMal Data

- Developed consensus on standard definitions
- Standard classification of events
- Standard categories

Root Cause Analysis Information Exchange

DATA CAPTURED

- What happened ?
- Who was involved ?
- When did it happen ?
- Why did it happen ?
- How is it remedied ?

FEATURES


- Web-based
- Ease of Use
- Near Miss and Adverse Events
- Follows RCA workflow
- Structured data collection
- Codified using CRICO taxonomy
- Action Plans and Tracking
- Reporting Function

*Convene members in a
secure, safe environment...*

*“We live in a society bloated
with data but starved for
wisdom”*

*—Elizabeth Lindsey
Ethnographer*

Patient Safety Continuum



Convening Criteria

- Cluster of organizational events (e.g., retained sponges)
- High profile national event
- Individual concern related to a specific specialty
- NQF serious reportable events (SREs)
- Adverse event, near miss, or identified emerging risk that is a concern to the public and/or health care providers
- Any other significant adverse event that requires immediate review and response

Power of Convening

- Everyone comes to the table
- Discussions are relevant, focused and transparent
- Subject matter experts talk about strategies available to correct the problem...mitigate the risk of reoccurrence
- Together we can develop best practice recommendations to mitigate risk and improve patient safety

Wisdom from Convenings

Patient Safety Alerts

- Developed best practice guidelines to prevent harm
- Identified universal factors affecting front-line caregivers
- Promoted novel interventions to mitigate risk
- Identified emerging threats and near misses
- Identified common device failures

AMC|PSO:
*Present State to
Future Vision*

AMC|PSO Present to Future

- Medmal: lagging indicator although captures most egregious events
- Capture RCA information-more real-time
- Capture Transactional Data in EMR
 - Surveillance/Monitoring for early warnings
- Apply predictive analytics across data sets
- Broaden learning opportunities with PSO to PSO collaborations

*Closing Story: Remember the
Lessons....*

2007: Dennis Quaid's Campaign





In September 2006, three preterm infants in Indiana died as a result of lethal overdoses of intravenous heparin.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2006 THE BOST

Deaths of 3 babies in Indiana spotlight medication mix-ups

By Tom Davies
ASSOCIATED PRESS

INDIANAPOLIS — Early last Saturday, nurses at an Indianapolis hospital went to the drug cabinet in the newborn intensive care unit to get blood thinner for several premature babies.

The nurses didn't realize that a pharmacy technician had mistakenly stocked the cabinet with vials containing a dose 1,000 times stronger than what the babies were supposed to receive. And they apparently didn't notice that the label said "heparin," not "hep-lock," and that it was dark blue instead of baby blue.

Those mistakes led to the deaths of three infants. Three others also suffered overdoses but survived.

Now, their families, hospital officials, and prosecutors are asking the same question: How could this happen?

Experts say last weekend's overdoses at Methodist Hospital illustrate that, despite national efforts to reduce drug errors, the system is still fragile and too often subject to human error.

"I see what happened here as depressingly normal," said Dr. Albert Wu of Johns Hopkins University, coauthor of an Institute of Medicine report that estimated more than 1.5 million Americans



MICHAEL COMPOS/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Heather Jeffers (facing camera) was consoled by her mother Wednesday in Indianapolis. Jeffers's daughter, Thursday Dawn

- In **July 2008**, 17 infants received an overdose of heparin while being cared for in a Texas hospital
 - A preliminary investigation by the hospital indicated the error occurred during the mixing process within the hospital pharmacy.

From Safety Event to Actionable Response

Heparin Infant Overdoses & Mortality

September 2006	October 2007	November 2007	March 2008 / July 2008
<p>SAFETY EVENT 3 Premature Infant Deaths Automated Dispensing Cabinet Error - alerts, warnings, and advisories issued</p>	<p>Pharmaceutical company Medication labels approved for change</p>	<p>SAFETY EVENT 3 Infants receive overdose of Heparin including Quaid twins, relabeling had not been implemented</p>	<p>60 MINUTES Airs segment featuring Dennis Quaid and Kimberly Buffington</p> <p>July 2008, Texas 17 infants in a neonatal intensive care unit received heparin overdoses</p>

AMC PSO & CRICO Patient Safety Response Timeline

October 4, 2012	October 18, 2012	November 1, 2012	December 1, 2012
<p>SAFETY EVENT OCCURS Safety Event Information reported in RCAIE</p>	<p>AMC PSO Identifies trigger Convening session scheduled within 2 weeks of event notification</p>	<p>CONVENING SESSION Members and Subject-Matter Experts convene under federal confidentiality and peer-review protections</p>	<p>DISSEMINATE AMC PSO compiles, drafts, reviews and finalize actionable responses into patient safety alert</p>

*Together we **can** move
patient safety forward;
Together we **will** move
patient safety forward*